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Abstract 
Marek, W., and V.S. Subrahmanian, The relationship between stable, supported, default and 
autoepistemic semantics for general logic programs, Theoretical Computer Science 103 (1992) 
365-386. 
We investigate the relationship between various alternative semantics for logic programming, viz. 
the stable model semantics of Gelfond and Lifschitz (1988), the supported model semantics as 
developed by Apt, Blair and Walker (1988), autoepistemic translations (cf. Moore (1985)) of 
general logic programs and default translations of general logic programs, Reiter (1980). 
1. Introduction 
Several techniques have been proposed to handle negative information in deduc- 
tive databases and logic programs. These include, in the AI community, the methods 
of circumscription [22, 23, 13, 151, default logics [29, 321, and autoepistemic logics 
[24, 191. 
In the logic programming community, the general idea has been to identify one 
or more models of the completion (cf. Clark [4]) of a program as being the intended 
meaning(s) of the program. These techniques led to the notion of strati&don [2, 
311 in which a so-called standard (or canonical) model of the program completion 
was constructed and it was claimed that this model was the intended model of the 
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program. This approach was extended by Przymusiliski [27] who defined a class of 
programs called locally stratified programs. Recently, Gelfond and Lifschitz [7] 
proposed a stable model semantics for logic programs and showed that the stable 
model semantics extends the stratified semantics. 
However, it was soon realized by various researchers that a close investigation 
of the relationship between these varying formalisms was needed. This is because 
the number of such schemes for handling negative information is rapidly increasing- 
before allowing such an increase, one needs to examine the relationships between 
different schemes to understand exactly what the differences are, and to determine 
where the strengths and/or weaknesses of a particular scheme lie. At this point we 
are aware of investigations of the following relationships: 
(1) between circumscription and Clark’s completion [ 10, 291, 
(2) between circumscription and the closed world assumption [5, 9, 13, 261, 
(3) between autoepistemic logic and circumscription [8], 
(4) between default logic and circumscription [ll], 
(5) between the Clark completion and the Closed World Assumption [16, 301, 
(6) between autoepistemic logic and default reasoning [12, 201. 
In this paper, we study the connection between the supported model semantics 
for logic programming as developed by Apt, Blair and Walker [2], and nonmonotonic 
logic based semantics for logic programming. The latter consists of translating 
general logic programs into either autoepistemic theories or default logic theories. 
We show that there is a close correspondence between the semantics of logic 
programs under these differing semantical characterizations. 
2. Supported models and stable models 
We assume that the reader is familiar with the usual notions of term, atom, etc. 
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the languages we consider contain function 
symbols. Any unexplained notation may be assumed to be the same as that in Lloyd 
[161. 
Definition 1. If A is an atom and L,, . . . , L, are literals (that is atoms or negated 
atoms), then 
A+L,&...&L, 
is a clause. A is called the head of the above clause, and L, 8~. . . & L, is called the 
body of the above clause. 
Definition 2. A general logic program is a finite set of clauses. 
For the sake of notational simplicity, we will assume that the body of any clause 
is written as 
B, 8~ . . .&Bk&lD,&.-.&~D,,, 
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where the &‘s and 4’s are all atomic. Thus, in the body of any clause, the negative 
atoms occur after the positive atoms. As conjunction is commutative in nature, there 
is no loss of generality, as long as we deal with semantics with a commutative 
interpretation of conjunction only, in making this assumption. 
We may, in fact, assume that a general logic program P is a possibly infinite set 
of ground clauses. This is the same simplifying assumption made by Gelfond and 
Lifschitz [7]. Unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, throughout this paper, we 
assume that P is a possibly infinite set of ground clauses. The completion of P is 
defined in the same way as in Lloyd [16] except that one may now have infinitary 
disjunctions occurring in the completion. As usual, we restrict our interest to 
Herbrand models only and consider an interpretation to be a subset of the Herbrand 
Base BP of the program Z? The following definition is due to Apt, Blair and 
Walker [2]. 
Definition 3. An interpretation M of P is supported if and only if for all AE M, 
there is a clause in P of the form 
A+B,&. +~&Bk&lD,&...&lDm 
such that Mi=B,&..~&Bk&lD,&. * . & iDIn. (Here, b is the satisfaction 
relation.) 
Proposition 1 (Apt, Blair, Walker [2]). M is a supported model of P if and only if 
T,(M) = M. 
Proposition 2. Z is an Herbrand model of camp(P) if and only if T,(Z) = Z. 
We now give the standard definition of stable models due to Gelfond and Lifschitz 
r71. 
Definition 4. Suppose P is a logic program, and Z an interpretation. The Gelfond- 
Lifschitz transformation, G( Z, P) of P w.r.t. interpretation Z, is the program defined 
below. 
(1) If C is a clause in P of the form 
A-B,&.. .&B,&lD,&...&~D, 
wherem~O,andifforalll~i~m,D,srZ,thentheclauseAtB,&~~~&B,isin 
G(Z, Z’). 
(2) Nothing else is in G(Z, P). 
An interpretation Z is said to be GL-stable if and only if I = TG,,.pITo. 
The following alternative idea of stability is due to Truszczynski. We describe it 
below, and then prove that both concepts of stability are identical. 
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Definition 5. Suppose P is a general logic program and ME BP is an interpretation. 
The Gelfond-Lifschitz-Truszczynski transform G, takes an Herbrand interpretation 
M and a (general) logic program P as input and produces a new pure (that is 
negation-free) logic program, denoted G,( M, P) as output. GT( M, P) is obtained 
as follows: 
(1) If C is a negation-free clause in P of the form A + B, & . . . & B, and for all 
1 c is n, Bi E M, then C E G,(M, P). 
(2) If A+&&* ~~&&&lD,&. . * & 1D,,, is a clause in P such that for all 
1~j~k,allBjbelongtoMandforall1~j~~,D,~M,thenA~B,&~~~&B,is 
in GT( M, P). 
(3) Nothing else is in G,(M, P). 
M is said to be GLT-stable if and only if M = TGT(M.PjT~. 
Even though, in general, G( I, P) and GT( Z, P) are not identical, it is nevertheless 
true that the concepts of CL-stable models, and GLT-stable models are the same. 
Theorem 1. Suppose P is a program, and I is an interpretation. Then I is CL-stable 
w.r.t P if and only if I is GLT-stable w.r.t P. 
Proof. (=+) Suppose I is CL-stable. We need to show that I = TGr(,,FjT~. 
(I z Tcr(,,pj~w) Suppose A E I. Then, as I is CL-stable, AE T,(,,p,.Tw, and hence 
A E TG(,,plTk for some k. We proceed by induction on k. 
Base Case: (k = 0) If k = 0, then 
A+ 
is in G(I, P). Hence, there is a clause At lB, & . . . & lB, in P such that 
Zt=lB,&. . * & iB,. Thus, the clause A + is also in G,(I, P). Hence, A E TGs(,,P)T1. 
Inductive Case: Suppose A E TG( ,,pjT k for k 2 1. Then there is a clause 
in G(I, P) such that IF D, & * . . & D,. Thus, there is a clause 
AeD,&.. .&D,&lB,&...&lB,, 
in P such that IbiB, &. . . & 1B,. But then, the clause A + D, & . . * & D, is in 
G,(Z, P). By the induction hypothesis, we may assume that {D,, . . , Dm}c 
Tcrt~.wTw, and hence is in TG,(,,PITk, for some integer k,. Thus, A E 
T G,(,,Pj?(k,,+ 1) E TGTU,PI?W. 
As G,(I, P) c G(I, P), it follows immediately that TGs(,,p,Tw C_ TG(l.plTw. 
(+) The proof proceeds in the same way as the proof of (+) above. 0 
In view of Theorem 1, throughout the rest of this paper, we use the expression 
“stable model” to mean CL-stable model. 
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Example 1. Suppose P is the general logic program 
p+s&-lq 
q+ir 
r+ 
Let A4 = {p, r, s}. Then G(M, P) = G,(M, P) is 
and it is easy to see that M is stable. 
On the other hand, consider M’ = {p, r}. In this case, G( M’, P) and GT( M’, P) 
are different. The clause 
is in G(M’, P); however, this clause is not in G,(M’, P) because sg M’. 
Theorem 2. Suppose P is a logic program, and I is an interpretation. Then Tp( I) = 
TGCI,PI(O 
Proof. 
iff 3 C E P such that C = At &,Bi & &,lD, and I l= &,B, & LkilDj 
iff 3 C’ E G( f, P) such that C’ = A + &,Bj and 1 k &,B, 
Given a logic program P and an interpretation 1, it may be felt that G( Z, P) could 
be given an equivalent declarative definition by declaring G,( 1, P) to be the smallest 
(w.r.t. the ordering of subset inclusion) definite logic program which is a subset of 
G(O, P), if any, such that TGIC,,pj = Tp( I). Note that in general, a unique “smallest” 
set satisfying such conditions may not always exist. Even if such a unique smallest 
set G,( Z, P) exists, it may not coincide with G( 1, P) as the following example shows. 
Example 2. Let P be the program 
and let I=(q). Then G(Z,P)={ptp}, while G,(I, P) = 0. Note here that 
T ci,~,,p~(I) =0 = T,(I). In this case, note that Gr(I, P) = 0. 
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In view of Theorem 2, we may ask ourselves whether it is possible that G,(Z, P) = 
G,(Z, P). This property does not hold either, as the following example shows. 
Example 3. Let P be the pure logic program 
A+ 
B+ 
A +- B. 
Let I = {B}. In this case, GT(Z, P) = G(Z, P) = Z? However, T,(Z) = {A, B}. Thus, 
the smallest logic program G,(Z, P) such that TP( I) = TG,C,.Pj = {A c, B t}. 
The following result is a corollary of Theorem 2. It tells us that all stable models 
are also supported. 
Theorem 3. Every stable interpretation of P is a supported model of P. 
Proof. 
T,(M) = ~G(M,P,(W (by Theorem 2) 
= TGCM,P,( Tcj(M,P)Tu) (since M is stable) 
= TG,M,P,?w (since TCI‘CM,Pj t w is a fixed point of TGCM,Pj) 
=M (since M is stable). 0 
Corollary 1. (1) Zf M is a stable model of P, then M is a model of camp(P). 
(2) Mkcomp(P) i’T,(M)= M iffM is a supported model of P 
In addition, a stronger version of the corollary holds. 
Theorem 4. Zf M is a stable model of P, then M is a minimal Herbrand model of 
camp(P), that is M is a minimal$xed-point of Tp. 
Proof. Suppose M is stable and M’S M such that T,(M’) = M. G(M, P) c 
G( M’, P). Therefore, 
M = TWM,P,?W c TG(M.,P,?w. 
By Theorem 2, TG(M,,PJ( M’) = Tp( M’) = M’. Therefore M c TGCMS,Pj~~ c M’. 0 
Theorem 4 reflects an improvement upon a theorem of Gelfond and Lifschitz [7] 
in which they show that if M and N are different stable models of a program P, 
then M&Nand NgM. 
Note that the converse to Theorem 4 does not hold, that is camp(P) may have a 
minimal and supported model which is not stable (Example 7). 
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Stable models of logic programs are closely related to the Default Logic of [29]. 
Specifically, given a program P, we assign to it a default theory (Dp, W,) constructed 
as follows: If 
is a negation-free clause in P, then the formula 
B, 8~. . .&B,+A 
belongs to W,. Nothing else is in W,. Clauses containing negations in the body 
are interpreted as default rules 
A+B,&.. ‘&B,&1D,&...&lD,,, 
is transformed to 
B,&.. .& BI,:lD,;..lD, 
A 
which belong to Dp (Notice, that the default resulting from a clause possesses, 
possibly, a justification consisting of multiple formulas). 
Example 4. If P is the general logic program 
r+w&ip. 
Then the default theory (Dp, W,) associated with P is given by 
w, = {(q*p), WI 
Dp consists of the following two default rules: 
r:iw 
9 
w:1p 
Formally, a default is a triple d =(p(d),j(d), c(d)) where p(d) is called pre- 
requisite of d, j(d) is a finite list p, , . . . , pm of formulas of our underlying language 
L, called the ju.stiJcation of d, and c(d) is again a formula of L called the conclusion 
of d. Traditionally, we write 
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Given a fixed theory S included in L and a fixed default theory (0, W), define 
Reiter’s operator Rs as follows (in the sequel, T is a set of formulas): 
Here Cn is the consequence operator of classical logic, i.e. Cn(X) is the set of all 
first order logical consequences of X. Further, we assume that double negations are 
eliminated, i.e. the formula ll+ is treated as $. 
The following example illustrates the behavior of the Rs operator. 
Example 5. Let ( Dp, W,) be as in Example 4. Let S = {w} and T = W,. Then 
R,(T)= Cn(W,u{r])= Cn({w, r, (q*p)]). 
Operator RS is monotone and finitary and so it possesses a fixed point above any 
set W of formulas. Let FL be the least fixed point of Rs above W. S is called an 
extension of (0, W), if this least fixed point is precisely S, that is FL = S. 
We quote the following result due to Marek and Truszczynski [20]. 
Theorem 5. M is a stable model of a logic program P if and only if M is a maximal 
set of atoms such that Cn( W, u M) is an extension of ( W,, Dp). 0 
In this fashion we get a close connection between the class of stable models of 
a program and a classical mode of nonmonotonic reasoning. In Section 3 we shall 
establish yet another interpretation of logic programs in autoepistemic logic and 
with the help of it we also establish another connection with default logic. This ties 
up supported models with different structures for default logic. The following result 
is a corollary of Theorem 4. 
Lemma 1. Let M be any model of P Then Tcj(M,p,Tw G M. 
Proof. As M is a model of P, Tp( M) c M. But by Theorem 2, TG,M,Pj( M) = Tp( M). 
As TG(M,PI is a monotonic operator, for all ordinals (Y it is true that T,,,,,,Ta G 
M. 0 
In general, there may exist supported models that are not stable. The following 
example shows this. 
Example 6. Let P be the program {p + p}. Then M = {p} is a supported model of 
P, but M is not a stable model of l? This is because G( M, P) is P itself, and the 
least model of P is (/1. Hence, M is not stable. 
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We know, by the theorems above, that if P has a stable model, then camp(P) is 
consistent. Unfortunately, there are simple programs having consistent completions 
but possessing no stable models. (Gelfond and Lifschitz present an example of a 
program having no stable models, but their program has an inconsistent completion.) 
Example 7. Let P be the program 
Cl: p+1p 
c2: p+q 
c3: q+q. 
From Table 1, we can verify that this program has no stable model; however, 
camp(P) is consistent (the interpretation {p, q} is a mode1 of corn(P) and indeed, 
this is the only Herbrand mode1 of camp(P) and hence the only supported model 
of P which is necessarily minima1 by uniqueness. It is however, not stable. 
Table 1 
I G(L P) TG,LP,?W Comments 
e c2, c3, p * {PI not stable 
{P) c2, c3 M not stable 
(4) c2, c3, p t {PI not stable 
{P, 41 c-2, c3 cn not stable 
Theorem 4 tells us that all stable models are minima1 supported models. Example 
7 demonstrates that there are minimal supported models of logic programs that are 
not stable, that is the converse of Theorem 4 does not hold. 
Example 8. Let P be the program 
Then M, = {p} and M2 = {q} are stable models of P, but M, u M2 = fl is not a stable 
model of I? Similarly, M, u M, = {p, q} is not stable either. Indeed, it is easy to 
verify that there is no interpretation M such that M 2 M, and M 2 M, such that 
M is a stable model of I? Similarly, there is no interpretation M’ such that M’c M, 
and M’S M, such that M’ is a stable model of l? 
By [7, Theorem 21, we know that if P is stratified, then P has a unique stable 
model, and this stable model coincides with the model constructed by the iterated 
fixed-point approach of Apt, Blair and Walker. We show below that this result can 
be extended to locally stratified programs. First, recall the definition of a locally 
stratified program [27]. 
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Definition 6. A program P is locally strati$ed if and only if its Herbrand Base B, 
can be decomposed into a family of disjoint sets (H,,),,_ y, where y is an ordinal, 
and such that whenever 
is a ground instance of a clause in P, and A belongs to the stratum H,, then 
(1) each B, belongs to the union U,_ (y H,, and 
(2) each Dh belongs to the union Up_cr Hp. 
The least such ordinal y is called the length of stratification (H,),.,,. 
Definition 7. If (H,,),,.: y is a stratification of P, then P,, is the set of clauses C in 
P such that the head of C belongs to H,. Furthermore, per = U,.. (II PO. Likewise, 
fi, = Up<, Hp. 
In this fashion, p,, = P. Often, given a local stratification (H,,),,_ y of P, we will 
abuse notation and call (P,),,. v the local stratification of f? 
Definition 8. Suppose P is a program and I an interpretation. The cumulative upward 
iteration of Tp from I is defined as 
T,>flO( I) = I 
Suppose now that (H,,),,, y is a local stratification of P. Consider ( P,X),C. y. Then 
the standard model !li, of P is constructed by the following transfinite induction 
process; 
and for O<a< y 
Then !Ji, = S, is the standard model of P. The following theorem has been announced 
by Gelfond and Lifschitz [7] and independently by Przymusinski and Przymusinska 
(cf. [25]). We include a proof below since none has been published thus far. 
Theorem 6. Suppose P is a locally stratijied program. Then 
(1) P has a unique stable model, denoted Yp and 
(2) 9, is exactly the model !N, constructed by the transjinite iteration procedure of 
Przymusin’ski. 
Relafkmship between semantics ,for logic programs 375 
Proof. Let gud( P) = U,. y P,, be a local stratification of P. By induction of n < y, 
we show that every p, has S, as its unique stable model. 
Base Case: ( TJ = 0) P,, = $4 and S,, = $J and so we are done. 
Inductive Case: (7 > 0). Assume that for all [< 7, pi has S, as its unique stable 
model. In addition, we can assume that I, s 12+ScI G SiL. 
Case 1: (7 is a limit). In this case p,, = U,. 7) pi. We need to show that S, = 
LJi_ S, is a stable model of p,. Consider G(S,, p,). By the local stratification of 
P, P,, is also locally stratified. Consequently, G(S,, p,,) = UC. ‘I G(S,, pi). Hence, 
the least model of G(S,, p,,) is then equal to U,. T) S,. This last set is equal to S,. 
Hence, S, is a stable model of p,,. If M is a stable model of p,,, then M n fi, is a 
stable model of I’, and thus equal to Si by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, 
M = M n l?,, 
= ST, 
Hence, S, is the unique stable model of p,,. 
Case 2: (7 = ({+ 1) .for some ordinal {). We know that S, is the unique stable 
model of p, and p,, = p, u Pi. Now 
= s,u GJbJ(S,). 
To see that S, is stable is routine. We shall now prove that this is the unique stable 
model of p,, = PC+, . Suppose M is a stable model of p,,. Thus, M = T,,,,,p,l,Tw. We 
show that TG(M.~,jT~ = S,,. 
( T,,,,F~,?w c S,). Suppose AE T,;,,,p,,,Tw. Then A E T,,,,p?,Tn for some integer 
n. The proof is by a straightforward induction on n. 
(S, c TG,M,~,jT~). We know that 
S, = S, u zJ-r4SJ. 
By the induction hypothesis Si is the sole stable model of pi, and hence it follows 
that S, 5 M. A straightforward induction demonstrates that T,,fiw(S,) 5 M. Hence, 
S,=S<u TP<fi~(S,)~ M. 0 
316 W. Marek, VS. Subrahmanian 
Proposition 3. Let P be a general logic program and M a recursively enumerable subset 
of the Herbrand Base B, of P. Then 
(1) the problem “Is M a stable model for P?” is rI:‘-hard. Moreover, it is in II:. 
(2) the problem “is P’= G( M, P)?” is ny-hard. Moreover, it is in II:. 
Proof. We outline the proof of (l), the proof of (2) is similar. 
First we show that problem (1) is IIt-hard. This is shown by demonstrating a 
reducibility to the well-known II&complete problem “Given r.e. sets S, , S2, is 
S, = Sz ?” Let Q be a pure logic program having success set S, . Then G(S, , Q) = 
G( S2, Q) = Q. Clearly, 
S, =Sz iff Totw =Sz 
iff S, is a stable mode1 of Q. 
It follows that the problem S, = S, can now be solved by an oracle query asking if 
S, is a stable model of Q. Hence (1) is @-hard. 
We now show that (1) is in II!. As M is r.e. and a P is recursive, it is easy to 
see that the problem of whether a ground clause is in G( M, P) is Ey. Thus, G( M, P) 
is a 1: set of clauses. Let F[x] be a Z5: formula containing free variable x that 
defines G( M, P). It is easy to show that TGCM,,,,t w is r.e. relative to G(M, P). Thus, 
T,;, M,P)? w is in 2:. Let G[x] be a Cy formula containing free variable x that defines 
TGCM,,,)T~. Then M is a stable model of P if and only if M = TGCM,PjT~ if and only 
if (Vx)(F[x]e G[x]) which is a II: formula. 
to see (2) we notice that comparing recursive set (P’) and a A; set is expressible 
as a II: sentence. 0 
Remark 1. Suppose P, , P2 are general logic programs such that no predicate symbol 
occurring in P, occurs in Pz and vice versa. Then, if M,, M, are stable models of 
P, , P2 respectively, M, u Mz is a stable model of P, u Pz. 
Theorem 7. There exists a logic program P having continuum-many stable models. 
Proof. Take P to be the program 
r(O) + 
44X)) + r(X) 
P(X) + 1q(X) 
q(X) + lP(X) 
Let R = {r(O), r(S(O)), r(s(s(o))), . . . }. Any superset X of R such that for all ground 
terms t exactly one of p(t), q(t) is in X is a stable model of l? 0 
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Definition 9. Suppose P is a general logic program, and A E B, is a ground atom. 
We say A is stably valid w.r.t. P (denoted P++,, A) if and only if A is true in all 
stable models of I? 
The following results are immediate corollaries of Theorem 4. 
Theorem 8. Suppose P is a general logic program. Zf A E T,( Br,p,t~, then PH.,, A. 
Proof. We need to show that if M is a stable model of P, then A E M. As M c B,, 
G(Bp, P) c G(M, P). Hence, Tc;ctl,,rPI?~ s ‘T”(M,I’~?oJ. As A E T~;~H~,P,?w, A E 
T G,,,,,P,r~. As M is stable, M= TG,M,p)T~. Hence, AE M. 0 
Intuitively, Theorem 8 gives us a sufficient condition for checking whether an 
atom A is stably entailed by I? Likewise, Theorem 9 below gives us a sufficient 
condition for checking whether a negated atom is stably entailed by I? 
Theorem 9. Suppose P is a general logic program and A E BP. Zf A& TG(o,pITw, then 
PH,~ -IA. 
Proof. Let M be any stable model of I? As Oc M, G( M, P) c G(0, P). Hence, 
T,,M,p,f~ L T,,,,,,Tw. As M = T,,,w,,>,?o (M is stable), M g TG(I,,p,Tw. Thus, if 
A g Tccn.p,tw, A g M. 0 
Unfortunately, the problem of stable validity of both ground atoms, and negated 
ground atoms may be highly undecidable as Corollary 2 below demonstrates. 
Proposition 4 (Apt and Blair [I, Theorem 221). For each n > 0, there is a program 
P such that the standard model of P constructed by the transfinite iteration procedure 
of Apt, Blair and Walker [2] is a X:-complete subset oj’the Herbrand Base of P. 
Corollary 2. For each n > 0, there is a logic program P such that 
(1) thesetY(P)={AEB,IP ++$, A} is a IX,-complete subset of B, ; 
(2) the set 9(P) = {A E BP ) PH$, TA} is a IIf -complete subset of B,. 
The above corollary demonstrates that the stable model semantics can be highly 
intractable. 
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3. Autoepistemic translation of a logic program 
In this section we investigate the relationship between supported models of a 
general logic program and the logic of an ideally introspective agent. We show that 
under the epistemic translation ET (to be introduced below) of logic programs there 
is a one to one correspondence between the supported models and the so-called 
autoepistemic expansions of translations (cf. [24]). 
Autoepistemic logic was proposed by Moore [24] as a formalism for a reasoning 
agent to be able to reflect upon her/his own knowledge. We observe that Gelfond 
[6] has also defined a translation of logic programs into autoepistemic theories, but 
as will shortly become apparent, our transformation is somewhat different and leads 
to some interesting connections between supported models of logic programs and 
expansions of autoepistemic theories. 
We briefly review the basic results pertaining to autoepistemic logic, as proved 
in [18, 12, 191. 
Let L denote a propositional language whose logical symbols are the usual symbols 
of propositional logic’. Cn is the well-known Tarski consequence operation of the 
propositional logic, sometimes called tautological consequence. L can be extended 
to a modal language L, by introducing a unary connective K. Every formula 4 of 
L is in L,, and if $ is a formula of LK, then K$ is a formula of LK. Intuitively, if 
IJ? is a formula, then KG may be read as “+ is known to be true”. When discussing 
L,, the consequence operation Cn acts on the theories in the modal language as 
well, except that here evey expression K4 is treated as an atom. 
Given the language of modal logic L K, a theory T s LK is called stable if it satisfies 
the following conditions: 
(Stl) T is closed under propositional consequence, 
(St2) 4 E TJK~ E T, 
(St3) +a T=+lK+ E T 
Given a theory Z s LK (think about Z as the initial assumptions of an agent), a theory 
TG L, is called an expansion of Z [24] if it satisfies the following condition: 
T=Cn(Zu{K+: 4~ T}u{lK+: ~~ T}). (*) 
Hence, as it happens often both in logic programming and related topics, expansion 
is defined via a fixed point of an operator. Not every theory Z possesses an expansion 
and if one exists, it need not be unique. The operator whose fixed points are 
expansions is by no means monotone. One notices that every expansion of Z is a 
stable theory in LK. In [ 18, 121 it was proved that every Z g L (that is without 
occurrence of K) possesses a unique expansion. This unique expansion, called below 
Exp( I) possesses the property that Exp( I) n L = Cn( I). Before showing how Exp( T) 
is constructed when T G L, we explain notation. LK denotes the language of L 
extended with the modal operator K as explained earlier. Formulas of LK have an 
’ Throughout the rest of this section, we assume that logic programs are all propositional in nature. 
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associated K-depth defined as follows: if 4 is in L, then K- depth( 4) = 0. K- 
depth(K4)=1+K_depth(4). K-depth(l4)=K-depth(+). K-depth($&$)= 
K - depth( 4 v $I) = max{ K - depth( +), K - depth( $)}. LK,, denotes the set of all for- 
mulas of LK of K-depth at most n. For T G L, Exp( T) is constructed as follows: 
Exp,( T) = Cn ( T) 
Exp,,+,(T) = Lc,,+ I nCn(Exp,,(T)nIK~I~EExp,(T)J 
u{+ib Ccr~ (kn -Exp,,(T))I) 
Exp( T) = fi Exp,( T). 
s-0 
Note that Exp( T) is defined even when T g L. However, in such cases, Exp( T) may 
not be an expansion of T. Marek and Truszczynski and independently Konolige 
[ 18, 121 show that for all T G L, Exp( T) is an expansion of T. In order to investigate 
expansions we need a criterion from [ 191 which establishes both a normal form for 
expansions and necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of expansions. To 
this end, notice first that theories with identical propositional consequences have 
precisely the same expansions (this follows easily from the definition of expansion). 
Consequently, every theory I can be represented by a collection of implications of 
form. 
K4,&. . . & Kc&,, & lK1+5,&. . . & lKt+h,,+w 
where w E L, that is w contains no occurrences of the modal operator K. 
(**) 
Hence assume that I consists of implications of form (**). 
we write such formulae as AJU where 
A=K4,&.. . & Kc#+,, & lK$, 8~. . . & lK& 
is called the epistemic justification of w and w is called the 
implication. 
Hence, let Z={cp,: l~i~k}, cp,=A,+q. We have (see 
theorem. 
To simplify notation 
objective part of the 
[ 19]), the following 
Theorem 10. (1) Every expansion of I is of the form Exp({w, : i E J}) for a suitably 
chosen J G { 1, . . . , k}. 
(2) Zf T is an expansion of I, then for some set J G { 1,. . . , k}, T = Exp({w, : i E J}) 
and I G Tfor all i E J, A, E T. 
(3) I~ZG T=Exp({w,: i E J}) and for all i E J, A, E T, then T is an expansion of I. 
A word of caution is appropriate here. In general, a given theory T does not 
uniquely determine a set J such that T = Exp({ w, : i E J}). T c I is an expansion of 
Z if and only if there exists at least one set J such that T = Exp({w, : i E J}) and for 
all i E J, E, E T. 
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Before we introduce the translation and prove the results connecting supported 
models and explanations of translation, we need to introduce one more property 
of stable sets (and hence expansions as well). 
Theorem 11. (cf. [19]). Let the,formula 4 have the property that for every atom a, 
every occurrence of a appears within the scope of modal operator K. Then, for every 
stable theory T, 4 E T or (14) E T 
We introduce now the notion of epistemic translation of a logic program. This 
translation is different from that of Gelfond (cf. [6]) and in fact relates to the notion 
of supported model and not to that of stable model. 
Definition 10. Suppose P is a logic program, and A E B,. Denote by !Ji( P, A) the 
set of clauses in P having A as the head. Thus, 
P= u !N(P,A). 
AtB, 
Let!Ji(P,A)={C,,C,,.. . }, where each C, is of the form 
A+B;&. . . & B;,! & lo’, &. . . & TO;,, . 
Then the epistemic translation ET(P, A) of P with respect to A is the set of clauses 
{KB; &. ..&KB:,,,&lKD;&...&lKD:,,~A:i=1,2 ,... } 
together with the (possibly infinitary) sentence 
A (l(KB; &. ..&KB,,&lKD;&...&lKD:,))~lA. 
i-l 
The epistemic translation ET(P) of the logic program P is 
ET(P)= u ET(P,A). 
ni B,, 
As usual, in the above translation, we replace all occurrences of formulas of the 
form 1lF by F. The potentially infinitary clause of the form A+ lp in ET(P) 
above allows us to derive a negated atom when no epistemic justification is available. 
Although this formula may be infinitary, it poses no problem as we may assume 
that Exp(S) is closed under infinitary conjunctions. 
Example 9. Suppose P is the logic program below, 
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then ET(P) is 
Kq+p 
Kr&lKq+p 
l(Kqv(KrblKq))+lp 
Kq+q 
1Kq + 1q 
r. 
Example 10. If P is the program 
ET(P) is 
Kp --z lp. 
Theorem 12. Suppose P is a general logic program and M is a supported model of P. 
Then Exp( Th( M)) is an expansion qf ET(P). 
Proof. Notice first that the formulas of the translation have the form 
or 
AJP 
A+lp 
for epistemic formulas A. Moreover, in the latter case, the formula E unique (up 
to reordering of the individual conjuncts). 
Since Th(M) = Cn(M u (1~: p E BF - M}), we will have a proof of the theorem 
if the following three items are proved: 
(a) ET(P) G Exp(n(M)) 
(b) Whenever p E M there exists a formula A=3p in EY( P) such that A belongs 
to Exp( Th( M)). 
(c) Whenever p E B, - M, the unique A such that A=+lp E ET(P) belongs to 
Exp( Th(M)). 
(a) Case 1: cp =A=+p. 
(I) If p E M then p E Exp( I%(M)), hence cp E Exp( Th( M)). 
(II) If p G M then, since M is a supported model all the bodies of clauses of P 
having p as the head must be false in M. It is easy to check that the epistemic 
translation of such a body does not belong to Exp( Th( M)) and consequently, using 
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Theorem 11 we find that its negation does belong to Exp( 771( M)). Since the latter 
is closed under consequence, Atip E Exp( 77t( M)). 
Case 2: 4 = A=YI~. 
(I) If p& M then lp~ 712(M), hence A+lp~Exp(Th(M)). 
(II) If p E M we reason similarly to case l( II). Since M is a supported model, 
at least one of the epistemic justifications for p belongs to Exp( Th( M)). Since the 
unique epistemic justification of lp is the conjugation of negations of epistemic 
justifications for p, it is easy to see that the negation of the epistemic justification 
of lp belongs to Exp( Th( M)). Hence Aalp E Exp( n(M)). 
(b) Let p E M. We need to prove that p possesses at least one epistemic justification 
in Exp( Th( M)). This, however, follows, directly from the fact that M is a supported 
model of P 
(c) Let p & M. Since M is a supported model, all the bodies of clauses of P having 
p as the head must be false in M. Hence their epistemic translations do not belong 
to Exp( n(M)). Consequently negations for all the epistemic justifications of p do 
belong to Exp( Th( M)). Hence their conjunction (which is the epistemic justification 
of lp belongs to Exp( Th( M)). 
This completes the proof of the theorem. 0 
Theorem 13. Suppose P is a general logic program. If T is an expansion of ET(P), 
then T is of the form Exp( Th( M)) f or a unique supported Herbrand model M of P. 
Proof. It is quite clear what M should be, namely let 
M={~EB~:~ET}. 
(This is the same as saying that M = B, n T, that is M is the set of all ground atoms 
occurring in T.) We need to prove three items: 
(a) M is a model of P, 
(b) M is supported, 
(c) T=Exp(Th(M)). 
(a) IfC=A~B,&,..&B,&lD,&...&lD,isaclauseofP,then,ifAEM, 
then M models C. If A .@ M, then since ET(P) c T, A cannot possess an epistemic 
justification in T. Consider a justification 
E = KB, &. . .&KB,&lKD,&..~&lKD,. 
Since E does not belong to T, 
lKB, v . . ~v~KB,,vKD,v~~~vKD,, 
does belong to T. Since T is stable and consistent 
B,& TV.. .vB,&TvD,ETv...vD,,ET. 
This means, according to the definition of M, that M does not satisfy 
B, 52. . .B,,,&~D,&~..&~D,,. Hence MkC. 
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(b) We need to show that, whenever AE M, there is a clause A+ 
B, & . ’ . B, & lD, &. . .&lD, ofP,suchthat M+%,&...B,,,&lD,&...& 
lD, of P 
Otherwise, for every epistemic justification E of A, E & T, but then the conjunction 
of the negations of justifications does belong to T. Since ET(P) c_ T, and the 
justification of IA is in T, RAE T This, however, is a contradiction since for all 
AeB,,A~MifandonlyifA~T. 
(c) Finally, we show that T = Exp( 7’/1( M)). Let us notice that the reasoning of 
point (b) shows that for every atom A E B,, A E T or 1A E T This, in particular, 
implies that T n L is a complete theory. Now, Th( M) is also a complete theory and 
Tn L and Th( M) contain precisely the same atoms. Hence Th( M) = Tn L and 
since T = Exp( T n L), the proof is complete. 0 
Corollary 3. M is a supported model of P ifs Exp( 771 (M)) is an expansion of ET(P). 
In Section 2 we noticed (cf. Theorem 5) a connection between stable models and 
extensions of default translation of logic programs. Our results of this section provide 
us with yet another connection with default logic, this time, however, with different 
structures. 
In [21] the connection between autoepistemic logic and default logic was studied 
in detail and the class of objects in default logic corresponding to autoepistemic 
expansions was fully identified. These objects, called in [21] weak extensions are 
defined as follows. 
Definition 11. Let (D, W) be a default theory. A theory T c L is called a weak 
extension of (0, W) if and only if T satisfies the following fixed point equations: 
T=C~(W~{~(~):~ED&~(~)ET&V~~,~~~~B~T}). 
Extensions of a default theory are weak extensions but the converse implication 
does not need to hold. 
By Konolige’s translation of a default theory (0, W) we mean a theory 
T n,w = Wu {Kp(d) & /J {lK+: p Ej(d)}+c(d)}: d E D}. 
Let us quote now two results of [21] which are immediately seen to be relevant 
to our considerations. 
Theorem 14. A theory SE L, closed under propositional consequence, is a weak 
extension of a default theory (0, W) if and only if Exp(S) is an expansion of the 
autoepistemic theory Tt,,. 
Theorem 15. For every theory Z c LK there exists a default theory (D, W) such that 
the expansions of Z are precisely the same as those of T,, ,,+,. Hence the expressive power 
of autoepistemic logic is precisely the same as that of default logic but with weak 
extensions. 
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Let us indicate how Theorem 14 is proved (for full details, see [21]). If I G Lk, 
then there exists a theory I’ such that every 4 E I’ is of K-rank at most one and Z 
and I’ have precisely the same expansions. Once this fact (proved by reduction of 
the K-rank of formulas) is established it is easy to see that a formula of rank at 
most one is equivalent to the conjunction of a finite number of Konolige’s translations 
of defaults. Consequently, Theorem 14 is applicable. 
Combining these results and Theorem 13 together, we get the following. 
Corollary 4. For every general logic program P there exists a default theory (D, W) 
such that for every subset M of B,, M is a supported model for P ifand only if 7’h( M) 
is a weak extension of (0, W). 
To summarize, the results of this section show that whereas stable models are 
intimately related to extensions of default theories, supported models are associated 
(by a different translation) with weak extensions of default theories. 
4. Conclusions 
It is always surprising when constructions from seemingly unrelated domains turn 
out to be closely connected. Our results as well as other results mentioned in Section 
1 point to the existence of the same basic principles behind various modes of 
reasoning considered by the artificial intelligence community and by various interpre- 
tations of negation considered by the logic programming community. We can only 
hope that a single, unifying, approach eventually emerges. 
The primary aim of this paper is to clarify the various relationships between stable 
models of logic programs, supported models of logic programs, the default semantics 
for logic programs and the autoepistemic semantics for logic programs. The first 
two of these essentially claim that the meaning of a program is just the set of models 
of the program possessing certain properties. On the other hand, the last two 
essentially claim that the program’s meaning is exactly that of an (appropriately 
defined) translation of the program into a different logic (viz. default logic and 
autoepistemic logic). In this paper, we have studied 
(1) the connection between stable and supported models (Section 2), 
(2) the relationship between supported models and default logics (Corollary 4), 
(3) the relationship between supported models of a program and expansions of 
the program’s autoepistemic translation (Theorems 12 and 13). 
Thus, these results demonstrate the intricate, yet intimate, relationship between 
differing formalisms for negation in logic programming. We strongly believe that a 
through study of the interrelationships between varying formalisms for treating 
negation in logic programming and in AI are necessary, as there are far too many 
such formalisms today. 
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